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GUIDE TO ABBREVIATIONS
1.

"R"

refers

to the

record

of compiled

District Court

Pleadings.
2.

"RT"

3.

"TH"

refers to the Reporter's Transcript of Trial.
refers to a Transcript of a hearing.

There were

hearings on the Summary Judgment Motion and Motion for
Findings on September 10, 1985, November 13, 1985> and
December 10, 1985.
4.

Citation Form.

References in a citation to the record or

a

sequentially

transcript

indicate

page

and

line.

References to pages and lines are separated by a colon,
subsequent pages are separated by a semi-colon, (eq. RT.
45:1-5;

47:10-12

indicates

Reporter's

Transcript, Page

45, lines 1 through 5, and Page 47, line 10 through 12.)

LIST OF PARTIES

1.

Lucky

Seven

Rodeo

Corporation,

a

Utah

corporation,

Plaintiff and Appellant.

2.

Pat

Clark,

an

individual

Defendant,

Respondent

Defendant.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the

trial court erred in failing to give effect

to the clear

and unambiguous language of the Consent

Order and Judgment which permits an agricultural use of
the easement.
2.

Whether the

trial

court's

construction of the Consent

Order and Judgment is supported by the record.
3.

Whether

there

were

material issues of fact precluding

Summary Judgment as a matter of law.
4.

Whether the
whether

Order and Judgment is ambiguous, and if so,

the Court erred

in resolving the ambiguity on

Summary Judgment.
5.

Whether the
from

trial court

admitted

facts

in

failed
a

to

light

resolve inferences
most

favorable

to

appellant.
6.

Whether the

trial court's finding of abandonment of the

easement is supported by clear and unequivocal evidence
of an intent to abandon.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

On

or

about

March

Corporation, hereinafter
Clark

to quiet

13,

1981,

Lucky

Seven

Rodeo

"Lucky Seven", filed suit against Pat

title to a 5.815 acre parcel of real property

located on the borders of their respective properties in rural
Washington County.

(R. 1)

At the time of trial, a dike and

small reservoir were located on a portion of the acreage.
convenience, this parcel was

referred

For

to as the "dike area."

After two days of trial the parties entered into a stipulation by
which Lucky Seven was granted a perpetual easement to use the
5.815 acre parcel.
Lucky Seven appeals from a Summary Judgment entered by
the Fifth Judicial District Court on January 23, 1986, terminating the easement for alleged inappropriate use and abandonment
of the easement property. (R. 220-222)
The

primary

issue

in

this

appeal

is

whether

Lucky

Seven's use of the easement property constitutes an abandonment
or warrants a termination of the easement.
A substantial portion of the trial testimony focused on
the

issue

of

Lucky

Seven's

historical

use

of

the

property over the years of an alleged adverse possession.

disputed
Russel

J. Walter, president of Lucky Seven Rodeo Corporation, testified
that the 5.815 acre parcel had multiple uses.
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Now, the portion
of
the ranch
referred to generally as the "pond"
and "dike" area, what did you use
that for?
The pond area and the dike area I
used to store water to irrigate the
fields on the south side of the
pond, fruit trees and so forth, and
I used it for pasture and water
storage. . . •
Now, while you
are
there, Mr.
Walter, are there any improvements
on that property that you placed
there-you or your family placed
there, that you were aware of?
Yes.
We decided a well right here
where it went down -* when we bought
the place, there was a well. It was
down, I believe, like 150 feet, or
something, and we drilled it on down
right here (indicating) right on the
dike and then we put in recreation
area,
basketball
court
here
(indicating)
then
we
done
the
smaller dike, pond work inside the
big major pond. . . .
Now,
did
you
improvements
on
itself?

ever
the

make
pond

any
area

Yes.
And what did you do?
We cleaned out the pond and built a
smaller pond in the middle, and the
well and the court.
And what did youThen, of course, that fencing there
too.
We
planted
in
there, we
planted.
I didn't hear you.
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A.

We planted, but it didn't grow very
good.

Q#

With respect to animals, did you
have animals inside that pond-dike
area?

A*

Yes.

(RT. 32:19-25; 33:9-19; 34:10-20; 38:2-23)
Patricia Walter also testified regarding the use of the
5.815 acre parcel.
Q.

r
A.

CRT. 119:

Could you
gentlemen
what uses
were put
time that

explain to the ladies and
of the jury and the Court
the pond and dike areas
to during the period of
you lived there?

Well, it was an area where we
collected our irrigation water that
came down a ditch from Central and
it was a place we occasionally kept
horses and some calves, sometimes.
It was kind of a playground for the
kids. Well, we had a boat on there
and they played with the neighborhood
kids on the pond
and we
maintained
the
area
like
you
would. We had a basketball court. .
. . It was an area where we often
kept livestock of different kinds,
horses or cattle. I painted it and
that's why it shows so good, because
I painted it. Then a little bit to
the south of the dike is where there
is a basketball court, and we also
had a volleyball net and badmitton,
there is a horseshoe pit there and
it was quite a gathering place for
the neighbors ranch kids because
there was a lot of things to do, a
lot of fun. And we used the water,
of course, to irrigate these fields
and these orchards to the south and
west of the pond area....we used
this for so many different22-25; 120:1-4, 16-25; 121: 9-10).
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When the respondent Pat Clark was asked whether he had
observed

the

responded:

Appellant's

use

of

"I never have, sir."

the

disputed

(RT 208:

parcel,

11-15).

he

Otherwise,

Mr. Clark gave no testimony regarding any past or future intended
use of the disputed property.
At trial, counsel for respondent Pat Clark attempted to
minimize the frequency and importance of the appellant's use of
the pond for irrigation purposes.

For example, the cross-examin-

ation of Russel J. Walter proceeded as follows:
Q.

A.

You testified, as I recall, on
direct examination, that you used
the water from this subject pond or
reservoir
to irrigate the ranch
fields. Was that your testimony?
. Yes.

Q.

Now it's true that a goodly share of
the time the reservoir is dry, isn't
it?

A.

A portion of the time it is dry.

Q.

And isn't it true that actually the
reservoir is not the primary source
of water to irrigate those fields,
that you have other sources to
irrigate them?

A.

At the time we purchased the ranch,
it was the primary source. At the
present time, it is not.

Q.

There are other sources
there, aren't there?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you don't necessarily rely upon
water from the reservoir to irrigate *
the ranch, do you?

of

water

There are some.
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Well, not entirely, no.

A.
(RT. 127:2-19)
It

is

apparent

from

the

following

portion

of

the

transcript of the trial that after hearing testimony regarding
the multiple

uses of

the disputed

increasingly disinterested

property, the Court became

in testimony regarding multiple uses

of the disputed area, and discouraged additional testimony on use
of the easement area.
Mr. Anderson: Your Honor, I would offer in
evidence what has been offered as Plaintiff's
Exhibit 31.
The Court:
counsel?

What is the purpose of this,

Mr. Anderson: Well, from another point of
view, showing the utilization of the pond to
the ranch.
The Court:
probe?

What does utilization of the pond

Mr. Anderson:
to the ranch.

Well, its use in relationship

The Court: Well, there's no issue that it has
use to the ranch, is there Mr. Foremaster?
There is an issue as to who owns it, isn't
that it?
(RT. 46:6-18)
It is clear from the record that Lucky Seven had made
many uses of the property, including stock corralling, holding
irrigation water, planting, and various recreational uses.

There

is no record that any one use was dependant, contingent or predicated upon another use.
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On

the

third

day of

trial, the parties negotiated

a

>

settlement.
and

signed

The parties1 oral stipulation was reduced to writing
by

the

parties

and

their

counsel.

(R.

152-155)

Counsel submitted the form of an Order and Judgment consistent
with the oral and written stipulation which was signed by the
District Court Judge on February 13, 1984.
Paragraph three

(R. 156)

(3) of the Order and Judgement entered

by the District Court states that Lucky Seven is to have
an exclusive and perpetual easement to use,
maintain and operate the reservoir and dike
are [sic] which are described in paragraph 2
above for irrigation, stock watering, corralling of animals and agricultural purposes,
together with the obligation that plaintiff
shall maintain the fences enclosing the area
hereinabove described. (R 157, 1f 3)
Paragraph

five

(5) of the Court's Order

and

Judgment

grants Lucky Seven an easement across the Defendant's land for a
"ditch" presently running from the town of Central to the reservoir.

Lucky Seven was further granted the right to improve said

ditch by installation of a pipeline and all necessary rights of
ingress and egress to maintain the same.

(R. 157, fl 5)

In Paragraph 6 of the Order and Judgment, the parties
provided for termination of the easement as follows:
In the event the reservoir and dike area
described in paragraph 2 above were to fall
into non-use for a period of ten (10) consecutive years, the easement granted in paragraph
3 above would expire automatically without
notice. (R. 158, 1f 6)
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In 1985, Lucky Seven removed from the easement a portion
of a dike located on the property, and began to level the ground
in preparation for planting.

(R. 188, 1f 8)

The fee owner, Pat Clark, filed a motion
Judgment.

(R. 180)

for Summary

Pat Clark filed an affidavit in support of

Summary Judgment, alleging that the purpose of the easement was
to use and maintain a dike and reservoir and that Lucky Seven's
voluntary removal of the reservoir and dike in 1985 destroyed the
need and purpose for the easement, thus, destroying the easement
itself.

(R. 182-184)
Lucky

Seven

responded

by

filing

the affidavit of its

president, Russel J. Walter, who testified that he understood and
intended that the easement granted alternative uses of the 5.815
acre parcel, including "agricultural purposes."

Russel Walter's

affidavit further stated that Lucky Seven had elected to use the
easement for agricultural purposes, rather than a reservoir and
dike.

(R. 188, U 11)

Walter denied any intent to abandon the

easement and stated that he believed that Lucky Seven's removal
of the dike and reservoir for agricultural purposes was consistent with the language of the easement and intent of the parties.
(R. 188, 1[ 11)
Russel Walter's Affidavit

states

that at the time of

entering into a consent Judgment providing for alternative uses
of the 5.815 acre parcel, the parties "were aware and intended"
that upon installation of the pipeline replacing the ditch, and
that Lucky Seven had no obligation to continue using its water to
'12
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fill a pond.
was located

Lucky Seven also alleged that a portion of the dike
on Lucky Seven's separate property and that Lucky

Seven had determined

to remove that portion of the dike on its

property, thus creating

a breach

in the dike and making

that

portion of the dike located on the easement property useless for
holding water.

(R. 187/ 1f 7; 188/ H 12)

The District Court heard oral argument on Pat Clark's
motion for Summary Judgment on the 13th day of November/ 1985.
The Court stated

that

it was his

"direct

impression

that the

purpose of the lawsuit with respect to the area was for a reservoir

and

destroyed
prepared.

dike/"

and

ordered

that

the

removal

of

the

dike

the easement and directed that a Summary Judgment be
(TH Nov. 13, 1985/ P. 2: 18-20)
Counsel for Pat Clark submitted a proposed Summary Judg-

ment to which Lucky Seven filed objections and requested
ings.

(R. 203-206; R. 207-209)

find-

One of Lucky Seven's objections

was- that at the hearing on November 13f 1985/ the trial court had
stated that its ruling was based/ at least in part, on some ambiguity in the Judgment of February/ 1984.

The proposed Summary

Judgment, however, failed to specify the nature of the ambiguity.
(R. 107/ 1[ .1)
At a hearing on December

10, 1985f

counsel for Lucky

Seven objected to the proposed Summary Judgment in part because
the proposed Order failed to clarify what ambiguity was in the
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February, 1984 Order and Judgment.
P.5:11-20)
On

(TH Dec, 10, 1985, P.4:9-21;

1

Lucky

Seven's

request

to

identify

the

ambiguous

language, the Court ordered that paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the
original Order of February 13, 1984, be included in the Summary

It is unclear what ambiguity the Court had in mind.
However, it is possible that a typographical error may have
caused a potential ambiguity.
Paragraph 3 of the Order and
Judgment states:
Plaintiff Lucky Seven Rodeo Corporation and
its
successors
and
assigns
(hereinafter
"plaintiff") shall have an exclusive and
perpetual easement to use, maintain and
operate the reservoir and dyke are which are
described in paragraph 2 above . . .
(R. 157, emphasis added)
r •
The word "are" should have been "area". This typographical error may give an impression that Plaintiff was to maintain
the dike and reservoir, rather than the "dike and reservoir
area". The phrase "reservoir and dike area" is a short hand way
of describing the 5.815 acre parcel. This potential ambiguity,
however, is clarified by comparing the same phrase in paragraphs
2 and 6 of the same Order and Judgment, which clearly refer to
the larger 5.815 acre parcel. Similarly, the Stipulation upon
which the Order and Judgment was based consistently refers to
maintaining the "reservoir and dyke area" for agricultural and
other purposes. (R. 152, fll; 153, fl2; 154, «[5)
Lucky Seven requested findings. Lucky Seven requested
that the Court identify the ambiguity, and questioned whether the
trial court understood that the easement covered an area substantially larger than the reservoir and dike and that the words to
"maintain the reservoir and dyke are", really meant maintain the
reservoir and dike area, which was much larger than the reservoir
and did not imply keeping the reservoir intact.
(R. 207, 11 1;
208, fl 6,7)
The Court corrected the potential ambiguity and stated
that he understood that the reservoir and dike did not cover the
entire 5.8 acres, but that the easement area was larger than the
reservoir and dike. (TH. Dec.10, 1985, P.16:4-18)
14
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Judgment

because

ambiguity.

these

paragraphs

ostensibly

created

an

(TH Dec. 10, 1985, P.5:11-20).

At this same hearing on December 10, 1985, the District
Court explained his understanding of the February, 1984 Order and
Judgment.
It
was
for
the

was my understanding that the settlement
based upon the use of a reservoir and dike
certain property legally in the name of
defendant, Pat Clark.

So long as the reservoir and dike were to
continue in use-it being already in place-the
easement would continue.
I thought that's
what you agreed, but that the legal title
would remain in the name of the defendant.
It was my understanding at that time at the
time of the Summary Judgment and today, that
the reservoir and the dike, having been
removed, the easement use purpose was extinguished and the legal owner should again have
the property.
(TH Dec.10, 1985, P.12:1-13)
Further clarifying the Court's position, the Court said:
"The court does understand and found, and I
understood the thrust of the lawsuit to be,
that 5.8 acres and the easement was predicated
on there being a dike and reservoir there.
The Court finds that the sole purpose of the
reservoir and dike, or the easement for the
remainder, outside the exact area encompassed
by the reservoir and dike was predicated upon
there being a reservoir and dike there.
(TH Dec.10, 1985, P.16:7-12, 19:10-14).

The Court entered Summary Judgment and ordered that the
easement was abandoned and terminated.

Explaining his reasoning,
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the Court stated:
The Court being of the opinion that the reason
plaintiff was granted such easement under the
parties1 stipulation upon said real property
was to operate and maintain said reservoir and
dike for the benefit of the abutting agricultural property owned by and used by the plaintiff and for that purpose only and the reason
for the parties1 stipulation regarding said
easement was to provide said use and benefit
to abutting property, and the Court hereby
finding that the grant of said easement was
for the sole reason to enable the plaintiff to
use and maintain the reservoir and dike.
The Court found that the sole reason and purpose for the easement was to operate the
reservoir and dike and when these purposes
were destroyed, the plaintiff's right to use
and maintain the reservoir and dike thereon
for any other purpose expressed therein is
hereby terminated.
(R. 222-223)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On the third day of trial to quiet title, the parties
stipulated

that Lucky Seven be granted a perpetual easement to

use a 5.815 acre parcel of property.

This parcel had histori-

cally been used by Lucky Seven for many things, including planting

and

agricultural

purposes.

The

trial

court

entered

its

consent Order and Judgment, which described several uses, including "agricultural purposes".
Lucky Seven argues that the trial court's Summary Judgment

that

the easement

was

terminated

and

abandoned

by Lucky

Seven's removal of a dike on the property and leveling the ground
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in preparation for planting, an agricultural purpose, is contrary
to the clear language of the Stipulation and Order and Judgment.
The trial court found that the "sole purpose" of granting

the

easement

was

to enable

operate a dike and reservoir

Lucky

Seven

to maintain

and

for the benefit of Lucky Seven's

abutting property, and that continued use of the properry as a
dike and reservoir was a necessary "precedent" to any other use
such as an agricultural use.
The trial court's construction of the Order and Judgment
is erroneous.

Lucky Seven argues that there is no support in the

record for the trial court's erroneous "sole purpose" theory of
the intent of the parties.

The idea that maintenance of a dike

was a condition precedent to alternative uses is not found in the
record.

Further, Lucky Seven argues that the trial court was

without power to construe an unambiguous Order and Judgment.
Lucky Seven argues that the Order and Judgment entered
by consent is akin to a contract and the Court had no discretion
to alter the contract or agreement of the parties by construction.
The Affidavits

in support and in oposition to Summary

Judgment indicate a clear factual dispute about the intent of the
parties regarding use of the easement.

Lucky Seven's Affidavit

states that the parties knew and understood that the need for a
reservoir on the property would be eliminated by construction of
a

pressurized

irrigation

pipeline.

The

parties,

therefore,

agreed to alternative and multiple uses of the property, includ17
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ing agricultural purposes.

It was not intended that the dike and

reservoir remain on the property.
Pat Clark's Affidavitf

on the other hand, states that

the parties intended that the easement was granted only to allow
Lucky Seven to maintain the dike and reservoir to benefit abutting property.

When this purpose was removed, the purpose of the

easement was destroyed.
Lucky Seven believes that where the intents of the parties are in such clear dispute, the trial court erred in granting
Summary Judgment.

The trial court's resort to his unsupported

recollections of the intents of the parties to resolve the disputed factual issue was also error.
It is undisputed that Lucky Seven removed a dike on the
property and leveled

the property in preparation for planting.

Except for the language of the Order and Judgment allowing "agricultural" use of the easement, an intent to destroy the easement
might be inferred

from this conduct.

In view of the "agricul-

tural" uses allowed by the Order and Judgment, however, it may be
inferred that Lucky Seven intended to use the property consistent
with the Order and Agreement of the parties.

Of great signifi-

cance is the fact that the Order and Judgment contain no language
of condition

that would

indicate that an agricultural use was

conditioned on continued use of the reservoir.

The trial court

failed to resolve these inferences in a light most favorable to
Lucky Seven and erroneously entered Summary Judgment.
The trial court found that Lucky Seven had abandoned the
18
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

easement.

In Utah law abandonment of an easement must be shown

by clear and unequivocal evidence of an intent to abandon the
easement.

Since the Order and Judgment clearly states that the

property could be used for agricultural purposes, and the property had, in fact, been used for planting in the past, there is
no unequivocal evidence of an intent to abandon by Lucky Seven's
conduct in determining to plant the area, thus selecting one of
the permitted uses over another permitted use.

ARGUMENT I
THE CLEAR PROVISIONS OF THE STIPULATION AND
CONSENT JUDGMENT ALLOWING ALTERNATIVE USES
OF THE EASEMENT SHOULD BE GIVEN EFFECT AND
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT REVERSED.
The Order and Judgment entered February 13, 1984, states
in pertinent part:
Plaintiff, Lucky Seven Rodeo Corporation, and
its
successors
and
assigns
(hereinafter
"plaintiff") shall have an exclusive and perpetual easement to use, maintain and operate
the reservoir and dike are [sic] which are
described in paragraph 2 above for irrigation,
stock watering, corralling of animals and
agricultural
purposes, together
with the"
obligation that the plaintiff shall maintain
the fences enclosing the area hereinafter
described. (R. 157, <[ 3)

There is no dispute that in 1985 the Appellant removed a
dike which was located

on a portion of easement property and
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began to prepare the reservoir area for planting.

Lucky Seven

urges that this admitted conduct is not contrary to the clear and
unambiguous provisions of the stipulation of the parties and the
consent Order and Judgment.
Paragraph

three

(3) of the Court's Order clearly and

unambiguously provides alternative uses for the 5.815 acre easement , including

"agricultural purposes".

The

language of the

Order and Judgment does not suggest any single use, reason, or
purpose for the easement or any portion thereof.
Order

suggest

that some uses are predicated

continuation of other uses.

Nor does the

or conditional on

The language of the Order does not

suggest that any use of the entire easement or any portion thereof is of any primary or secondary importance.
In spite of the clear language of the Order and Judgment
the District Court found, "that the grant of said easement was
for the sole reason to enable the plaintiff to use and maintain
the reservoir
Court

said

and dike;"

that

(R. 223)

the use of

the

Amplifying
5.85

acres

this idea, the

"for

agricultural

purposes" was "predicated" on there being a reservoir and dike
there.

(TH, Dec.

10, 1985, 16:8-12).

In other

words, the

property must be used as a reservoir only.
This Court should give effect to the clear provisions of
the Order
Company,

and Judgment.
586

P.2d

446

Park City Utah Corporation v. Ensign
(Utah

1978);

Westbrook

v.

Lea

Hospital, 85 N.M. 191, 510 P.2d 515 (N.M. App. 1973).

General

This rule

is particularly appropriate in the instant case where the lower
20
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court entered the consent Judgment pursuant to the stipulation of
the parties.

In Payton v. Magleby, 30 Utah 2d 236, 516 P.2d 344

(1973), this Court held that a consent judgment given pursuant to
a

stipulation

is presumed

showing to the contrary.

to be correct

in the absence of a

A consent judgment, therefore, is a

contract between the parties, and the Court should give effect to
the clear language selected by those parties.

Parks v. Parks, 91

N.M. 369, 574 P.2d 588 (1978); Bean v. Carlos, 21 Utah 2d 309,
445 P.2d (Utah 1968); Owen v. Burn Construction Company, 563 P.2d
91 (N.M. 1977); State Highway Commission v. B. J. Clark, 439 P.2d
537 (N.M. 1968).
The clear provisions of the Order and Judgment simply do
not support the lower court's "sole reason" theory, nor is there
any support in the Order and Judgment, or in the entire record,
for

the proposition

continued

that agricultural uses were predicated

use as a reservoir only.

on

The clear language of the

consent Judgment to which the parties agreed was that there be
alternative

or

multiple

language of condition.

uses

of

the

easement.

There

is no

The Summary Judgment cannot be upheld

without ignoring or rejecting the clear provisions of the stipulation and consent Judgment.
This

Court

should

reverse

the

Summary

Judgment

and

direct the District Court to enter an order allowing agricultural
uses of the property giving effect to the Stipulation and Order
and Judgment.
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ARGUMENT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING
THE ORDER AND JUDGMENT.
The respondent, Pat Clark, filed a motion requesting the
District Court to interpret the Order and Judgment of February,
1984.

(R. 171)

The District Court undertook to construe the

Order and Judgment and thereafter entered its motion for Summary
Judgment.

(R. 222)

Lucky Seven urges that the trial court

erred in construing the Order and Judgment.

A
THE LOWER COURT HAD NO POWER TO CONSTRUE
AN UNAMBIGUOUS JUDGMENT,
As a general rule, the District Court has inherent power
to construe its Judgments.

However, this power does not extend

to an unambiguous Judgment.

Where a Judgment is unambiguous, the

Court may not construe it.

The Judgment must be enforced as it

speaks.

Park City Utah Corporation v. Ensign Company, Supra;

Kishner v. Kishner, 562 P.2d 493 (Nev. 1977); Spomer v. Spomer,
580

P.2c3 1146

(Wyo. 1978); Wells

v. Valley

National Bank

of

Arizona, 109 Ariz. 345, 509 P.2d 615 (Ariz. 1973).
Although

Pat

Clark

requested

the

District

Court

to

construe or interpret the Order and Judgment, he identified no
ambiguity in the written Judgment.
indicated

that

there

was

consent Judgment but failed
Seven

requested

that

some

The District Court initially
unspecified

to identify

the Court

identify

ambiguity

in

the

the ambiguity.

Lucky

any ambiguity

in the
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At a hearing on December 10, 1985,

Order and Judgment. (R. 207)

the Court identified paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Order and
Judgment as containing some ambiguity, however, the nature of the.
ambiguity was never articulated.

(TH., Dec.10, 1985, P.4:9-21)

In the absence of a finding of ambiguity, this Court
should proceed as if. the Order and Judgment is not ambiguous and
reverse

the

District

Court's

Summary

Judgment

based

on

the

Court's erroneous construction of the unambiguous language of the
Order and Judgment which allows agricultural use of the property.
The District Court could not construe an unambiguous Order and
Judgment.

B
THK T R I A L COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE JUDGMENT AND
ORDER IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD,
The Trial Court construed the Order and Judgment to mean
that agricultural purposes were

"predicated" on there being a

reservoir and dike on the property, and further, that the "sole
purpose" of the easement was to allow Lucky Seven to maintain
reservoir and dike to benefit adjacent property.

(TH., Dec.10,

1985, P.16:8-12)
This

Court

in

Park

City

Utah

Corporation

Company, Supra. , stated

that

if the meaning

v.

Ensign

of a judgment is

obscure or ambiguous the entire record may be resorted to for the
purpose

of

construing

the

judgment.

Even

if

the Order
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and

Judgment

in

this

case

were

ambiguous, opening

the

door

for

judicial construction, the Court's construction of the Order and
Judgment is wholly without support in the record.

While there is

support in the record that a portion of the easement property had
historically

been

used

on occasion

for

a dike and

reservoir,

there is no indication that this use was to be a predicate or
condition to other uses or that the parties intended that this
use necessarily be continued.

In fact, there is evidence that

the parties undertstood that there were other sources of water to
irrigate

the

pressurized

fields,
irrigation

that

the

pipeline

parties
would

understood
be

that

installed,

a

thus

eliminating the need for the reservoir, but not terminating the
(R.154, 1f 5; 157, M 5)

easement.

The Court in Parks v. Parks, Supra., held that stipulations must

be construed

to give

effect

to the

intent of the

parties, and in seeking the intent of the parties the language
used will be not construed so as to give the effect of a waiver
of a right not plainly intended to be relinquished.

The trial

court's construction of the Order and Judgment would waive Lucky
Seven's

right

to elect* alternative

uses

of

the

property

require it to continue to use the dike and reservoir.

and

Since this

is plainly not intended as no language of condition is employed
in the Stipulation, this construction is erroneous.
Simply stated, the Court's construction of the easement
which cannot be supported by the record, and would work a waiver
on Lucky Seven, cannot be upheld.
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c
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD NO DISCRETION
OR AUTHORITY TO ALTER OR AMEND THE
CONSENT JUDGMENT.
As earlier

expressed, a stipulated

Judgment

is not a

judicial determination, but rather, it is a contract between the
parties.

(Payton

v. Magleby,

Supra.)

As

such, a consent

judgment is not within the power or discretion of the Court to
amend or alter by construction or interpretation.
enforce

the

contract

which

the parties

The Court must

made.

Owenv.

Burn

Construction Company, Supra.
If

the

Court

had

found

an

ambiguity

in

the

consent

judgment, it would have been justified in judicially interpreting
or construing

the judgment, with

the aid of the record.

The

Court's subjective understandings, beliefs, or intents, however,
are wholly irrelevant since the Court was not a party to the contract.
The District Court in the case at Bar did not consider
the language of the stipulation or the record in construing the
consent Judgment.

Rather, the Court relied on its own recollec-

tion of the lawsuit, and without the aid of the record, made
findings based on that recollection rather than on the record.
The District Court stated:
The Court finds that the sole purpose of the
reservoir and dike, or the easement for the
remainder, outside the exact area encompassed
by the reservoir and dike, was predicated upon
their being a reservoir and dike there, and
that the area included in the easement is
larger than the area encompassing the reservoir and dike.
(TH., Dec. 10, 1985, P.19.)
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No support for this "sole purpose" theory or the Court's
"predicate" theory can be found in the record.

While this may be

the Court's understanding of the purposes of the easement, there
is no evidence that this was the intent or the agreement of the
parties, and the Court's understanding is irrelevant.
If the parties intended that the easement would terminate for non-use of the reservoir and dike, they could easily
have said as much.

Rather, the parties agreed that the easement

would terminate if the "reservoir and dike area fell into disuse
for a period of 10 years".

(It is important to note here that

the entire 5.815 acre parcel, only a portion of which had been
used as a dike and reservoir, was referred to for convenience as
the "reservoir and dike area".)
and provided

The parties clearly contemplated

for a termination as a result of total non-use of

the area, but

said nothing about termination

resulting

from a

cessation of a particular use of the area.
The District Court, in construing the consent Order and
Judgment, apparently assumed that this Judgment, like other nonconsent judgments, could be clarified, altered, or tinkered with
until

the

Judgment

was

consistent

with

judicial

intent.

consent judgment, however, is fundamentally different.

A

As stated

before, it is a contract, and as such the Court's intents and
understanding are irrelevant since the Court is not a party to
the contract.

The Court

is not entitled

to alter or amend a

consent judgment and fashion a new agreement to which the parties
did

not

agree, particularly

by

relying

on

its own
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feelings,

recollections, or
record.

understanding

of

other

matters, dehors

the

The Court's intrusion into the contract of the parties

in this matter

is beyond the power and discretion of the Court

and the Summary Judgment must be reversed.

ARGUMENT III
THE AFFIDAVIT OF ROSSEL J. WALTER RAISES
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT, THUS PRECLUDING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
It is admitted that a dike was removed from the easement
premises.

However, the understandings, intentions, and conse-

quences of this fact are vigorously disputed, therefore, this
matter

could

not

be

properly

resolved

by

Summary

Judgment.

Sandberg v, Klein, 576 P. 2d 1291 (Utah 1978). -.The

Trial

Court

entered

Summary

Judgment

because,

according to the Court, the parties intended that the easement
was granted

for the sole" reason to enable the Plaintiff to use

and maintain

the reservoir

and dike.

The maintenance of the

reservoir and dike was a condition precedent or prerequisite to
other uses.

According

the Court, the removal of the dike and

reservoir eliminated the intended use and purpose of the easement. (R. 220-223)

The supposed intent of the parties regarding

the purposes and uses of the easement was the central factual
question on Summary Judgment.
The intentions of the parties regarding the use of the
easement were placed squarely in dispute by the Affidavits of the
parties.

The.Affidavit of Pat Clark in support of his motion for
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Summary Judgment indicates that the intention and purpose of the
easement was to maintain the dike and reservoir.
davit states:

Clark's Affi-

;

3.
That Plaintiff has either caused to be
removed or has itself removed or allowed to be
removed from the real estate described in said
Order, the above mentioned reservoir and dike
for which said easement was granted, and the
same no longer exists and the said real estate
has been leveled and is presently being unused
as far as your Affiant can determine.
4.
That said reservoir and dike have been
completely destroyed and removed from the
property, and because of the same, said
property can no longer be used for the
purposes set forth in said easement, and as
above set forth and described.
5.
That because of the same the said
Plaintiff has, in effect, abandoned and forfeited said easement and has destroyed the
reason for said easement to exist.
6. That because of said acts of the Plaintiff
as aforesaid, the reason for grant of said
easement no longer exists.
(R. 183, emphasis added)
In his Affidavit in opposition to the motion for Summary
Judgment, Lucky

Seven's President, Russel J. Walter, disputed

Clark's assertions that the intent, purpose and reason for the
easement

was

to

require

alleged

that

maintaining
the

intent

the

Lucky

Seven

uses.

Walter's Affidavit states as follows:

dike

and

was to grant

reservoir.
alternative

6.
That the Defendant was aware that a
portion of the dike was located on the
Plaintiff's property and would be removed.
When the necessity for the reservoir was
obviated by the construction of a pipeline.
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9,
The easement was granted for several
alternative purposes and uses, including irrigation and stock watering, corralling of
animals and agrigultural purposes. Plaintiff
has elected to use the easement at the present
time for agricultural purposes.
10.
The easement does not require the
property to be used for a reservoir or dike,
but grants the Plaintiff an election of alternatives.
(R. 187, 188, emphasis added)
Comparing

the two Affidavits, it is clear

that Clark

claims that the purpose and intent of the easement was to operate
a reservoir and dike, while Lucky Seven averes that the intention
of the parties was to allow several alternative uses of the easement, not LHjuiiing its use as a reservoir and dike.
tions of the parties are clearly disputed.

The inten-

The Affidavits raise

an issue of fact, thus making Summary Judgment inappropriate as a
matter of law.

Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982).

The Kansas Supreme Court in Bowen v. W. H. Westerhaus,
224 Kan. 42, 578 P.2d
cautious

in

dispositive

granting

1102

(1978) held

summary

judgment

that courts should be
when

resolution

of

a

issue necessitates a determination of the state of

mind of one or both of the parties.
At hearing on Summary Judgment this factual dispute was
emphasized.

The District Court erroneously resorted to its own

opinion of the intentions and state of mind of the parties to
resolve this issue of fact.

The Court said:
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It
was
for
the

was my understanding that the settlement
based upon the use of a reservoir and dike
certain property legally in the name of
Defendant Pat Clark.

So long as the reservoir and dike were to
continue in use - it being already in place the easement would continue. I thought that's
what you agreed, but that the legal title
would remain in the name of the Defendant.
(TH., Dec. 10, 1985, P.12).
Before granting

Summary Judgment, the Court was aware

that the alleged intentions of the parties with regard to the use
of the reservoir and dike were in dispute by their Affidavits.
The

Court, nevertheless, relied

resolve

upon his own

recollection

to

the factual dispute of the state of the minds of the

parties on Summary Judgment.

If extrinsic evidence, even if it

be the Court's own recollections, is necessary to clear up an
ambiguity, Summary Judgment should not be entered.
Inc. v. Kurata, 508 P.2d, 889 (Kan. 1973).
erred

in

resorting

resolving

a

dispute

regarding

Mobile Acres,

The District Court
a

material

to his own understanding and recollections.

fact

by

Summary

Judgment must be reversed.

ARGUMENT IV
SUPPOSED AMBIGUITIES IN ORDER AND JUDGMENT
COULD NOT LAWFULLY BE RESOLVED BY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
While Lucky Seven does not believe the original Order
and Judgment was ambiguous regarding the alternative uses of the
easement, nevertheless, the Court indicated there may have been
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some

ambiguity.

The Court, however, declined

nature of the ambiguity.
that

the Order

and

to specify

the

In the event that this Court determines

Judgment

is

indeed

ambiguous, Lucky Seven

posits the proposition of law that Summary

lodgment is an inap-

propriate way to dispose of an ambiguity.

This Court held in

Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1983), that where a
written contract was determined

to be ambiguous, a motion for

Summary Judgment may not be granted

if the evidence

issue of fact regarding what the parties intended.

shows an

W.M. Barnes

Co, v. Ohio Natural Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981); Grow
v. Marwick Development Inc., 621 P.2d

1249

(Utah 1980); Amjacs

Interwest, Inc. v. Design Associates, 635 P.2d

53 (Utah 1981);

Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel Cattle Breeders of Canada Ltd. v. Y-Tex Corp.,
590 P.2d 1306 (Wyo. 1979); Lynch v. Spillman, 62 Cal. Rptr. 12,
431 P.2d

636, (Cal. 1967); Hamada v. Valley National Bank, 27

Ariz. App. 433, 555 P.2d

1121 (1976); Washington Hydroculture,

Inc. v. Payne, 96 Wash. 2d 322, 635 P.2d 138 (1981).
This general rule applies to judgments on stipulation as
well as <;; tracts and documents.

The Supreme Court in Park City

Utah Corp; v. Ensign Co., Supra, stated that "an ambiguous judgment on stipulation
written

is subject to all the rules that apply to

instruments."

Pennington

v.

Employer's

Assurance Corp., 520 P.2d 96 (Alaska 1974).

Liability

The application of

the general rule above-stated in the present case is particularly
appropriate
Judgment.

where

the parties

stipulated

and

consented

to the

This consent Judgment should be viewed and treated as
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a contract between the parties. (Payton v. Magleby, Supra.)

If

there is an ambiguity in the writing and the intentions of the
parties are disputed, Summary Judgment is inappropriate.

ARGUMENT V
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THE REASONABLE INFERENCES FROM
THE ADMITTED FACTS IN A LIGHT MOST
FAVORABLE TO LUCKY SEVEN.
When ruling on a motion for Summary Judgment, a trial
court

should

consider

all conflicting

inferences

arising

from

admitted facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d
Bendix

Corp. , 233 Kan.

Tabernacle

v.

434

870, 666

Pentecostal
Wash.

P.2d

(Utah 1982);
1175

Church

of

God,

App.

814,

650

Hustead v.

(1983);

Southside

Pacific

Northwest

District,

Inc.,, 32

P.2d

231

(1982);

Goodpaster

v. Pfizer, Inc. , 35 Wash. App. 199, 665 P.2d

414

(1983); Bowen v. W. H. Westerhaus, Supra.; State of Arizona v.
Ashton Co., Inc., 4 Ariz. App. 599, 422 P.2d 727 (1967); Weaver
v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Wyoming, 609 P.2d 984 (Wyo. 1980).
In the instant case, the easement states that the easement area may be used for "irrigation, stockwatering, corralling
of animals and agricultural purposes".

(R. 157, If 3)

indicates a history of multiple uses of this property.
davit of Russel J. Walter

states his understanding

were "alternative uses" of the easement property.
The

Affidavit

agreed

also

indicates

that

the parties

The record
The Affithat there

(R. 188, <[ 9)
understood

and

that the dike and reservoir would ultimately be removed
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when

Lucky

Seven

installed

the pressurized

irrigation

system,

>

thus giving an additional reason for the stated alternative uses
of the easement property.

(R. 187, 1[ 5) In light of these under-

standings and intents, as well as the : ^t: -:y of multiple uses of
the

property,

the

Appellant

admittedly

removed

the

dike

and

reservoir and began preparing the easement for agricultural use.
The admitted facts raise conflicting inferences.

It can

be inferred from these facts that Lucky Seven reasonably believed
that it could elect an alternative use of the property and remove
the dike without injuring or abandoning the easement, and therefore, did not have the requisite intent to abandon the easement.
When the conflicting inferences raised by the admitted facts are
properly

viewed

in a light most

favorable

to Lucky Seven, it

becomes clear that the District Court should have determined for
purposes of Summary Judgment that there was no clear or unequivocal

intent

to

abandon

the

easement

as

required

by

law, and

Summary Judgment should have been denied.

ARGUMENT VI
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT
ABANDONED THE EASEMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
ANY CLEAR OR UNEQUIVOCAL EVIDENCE OF
AN INTENT TO ABANDON.
This Court in Timpanogas Highland, Inc. v. Harper, 544
P. 2d 481 (Utah 1975), stated that an abandonment must be proved
by clear and unequivocal evidence of an intentional relinquishment of a right.

Thermo-Kinetic, Inc., v. Allen, 16 Ariz. App.
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341, 493 P.2d 508 (1972). In the instant case, there is no direct
or express evidence of an intent to abandon the easement.
fact, Lucky Seven expressly denied any intent to do so.
11 11)

In

(R. 188,

Thus, any evidence of the Appellant's intent to abandon

the easement

must

be

inferred

from

the circumstances

and the

Appellant's conduct.
In the present case, Lucky Seven's conduct is consistent
with the intent to elect an alternative use of the property as
permitted by the literal language of the easement.

Therefore,

the Appellant's conduct in removing the reservoir and dike standing alone is not unequivocal evidence of an intent to abandon.
There is simply insufficient evidence to support the finding of
abandonment.

v

The District Court purported to interpret and construe
the consent Order and Judgment.

As previously stated, a District

Court may not construe an order or judgment unless said judgment
or order is ambiguous.

Having interpreted or construed an uni-

dentified and unarticulated ambiguity in the Order and Judgment,
the District Court set about to punish Lucky Seven for failing to
properly construe the ambiguity and act in accordance with the
proper construction thereof.

It is difficult to understand how a

party can formulate an intent to abandon an easement when the
easement had to be interpreted and construed by the trial court
to establish which uses were permitted and which were not.

It

seems equitable that if a provision of an easement or judgment is
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capable

of

two

meanings

and

a

party,

before

a

judicial

construction or interpretation of the ambiguity, conducts itself
consistent with one of the possible meanings, that no intent to
relinquish
conduct.

a

r£ght

or

abandon

should

be

inferred

from, said

Under these circumstances, if the Court properly found

Lucky Seven's earlier

conduct to be contrary

to the clarified

Judgment, the appropriate relief was to issue an injunction or to
award

damages,

if

appropriate.

A

finding

of

abandonment,

however, is wholly inappropriate and inequitable.

CONCLUSION
The

conduct, of; Lucky

Seven

in removing

the dike and

preparing the easement for planting is an appropriate use of the
easement property.

This Court should make a denovo review of the

language of the easement and determine that Lucky Seven's conduct
was appropriate.

The Summary Judgment should be reversed, and an

opinion entered that Lucky Seven's conduct was proper pursuant to
the clear language of the easement.
In the event that this Court finds an ambiguity in the
Stipulation of the parties or the Order and Judgment, which constitutes the easement, then this Court should reverse the Summary
Judgment finding that the trial court's construction is erroneous
and remanding the matter to District Court, with instructions to
set

the matter

for

trial on

the

issue

of

the

parties regarding use of the easement.
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intent of the

In the event this Court determines that the Order and
Judgment

was

ambiguous

but

should

be construed

against

Lucky

Seven, then this Court should reverse Summary Judgment for the
reason

that there

is no unequivocal

evidence of an intent to

abandon the easement, and remand to the District Court for trial
on the issue of Lucky Seven's breach of the easement and damages.

Respectfully submitted, November 4, 1986.

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH

Timothy -ST. Anderson

Dale K'. Chamberlain
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WASHINGTON »;CU?iTY
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| 1 FEB 13 1984 |j \
£_

sr-zam.:,"

Timothy B. Anderson of
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOOGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
One South Main, Suite 300
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (801) 628-1627
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
LUCKY SEVEN RODEO CORPORATION
a Utah corporation,

STIPULATION AND
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 7917

PAT CLARK, an individual,
Defendant.
oooOooo
The parties above named appeared before the above
entitled Court for Jury Trial on the 14th, 15th, and 16th days of
December, 1983 at the Washington County Hall of Justice and on
December 16, 1983 entered into a Stipulation and Settlement of
all issues in the above numbered case as follows:
1.

Title to the reservoir and dike area shall remain in

the name of Pat (Chas.) R. Clark and Tex Gates. Said parcel
comprises that area used by Plaintiff Lucky Seven Ranch within
the fence lines and within the NW1/4 NW1/4 Sec. 28, T39S, R16W
and more specifically described as follows:
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of the Northwest
1/4 of the Northwest 1/4 of Section 28, Township 39
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

DEPUTY

S o u t h , Range 16 W e s t , S a l t Lake Base and M e r i d i a n ,
said p o i n t being S 0° 36* W 1299.425 feet along the
S e c t i o n line from the N o r t h w e s t Corner of said
S e c t i o n 28 and running thence N 0° 3 6 f E 339.00
feet to a p o i n t on an old fence l i n e ; thence a l o n g
an old fence line as f o l l o w s : N 79° 2 1 ' 3 0 " E
543.00 f e e t ; thence S 82° 3 0 f E 30.01 f e e t ; thence
S 18° 5 0 ' E 2 6 1 . 0 0 f e e t ; thence S 7° 4 0 ' SO11 E
200.00 feet to a p o i n t on the South line of the
N o r t h w e s t 1/4 of said S e c t i o n 2 8 ; thence leaving
said old fence line and running N 89° 0 9 ' 5 0 " W
6 7 8 . 0 0 feet a l o n g the 1/16 line to the point o f
beginning.
C o n t a i n i n g 5.815 A c r e s .
2.

P l a i n t i f f L u c k y Seven R o d e o Corporation and

s u c c e s s o r s and a s s i g n s
exclusive

its

(hei:e 1 i ta fter "P] a i n11ff") sha 1 1 h a v e an

and p e r p e t u a l e a s e m e n t to us**,, m a i n t a i n and o p e r a t e

reservoir and d i k e a r e a w h i c h are described

the

in p a r a g r a p h 1 a b o v e

for- i r r i g a t i o n , stock w a t e r i n g , corralling of animals and
agricultural

p u r p o s e s , together w i t h the o b l i g a t i o n

that

p l a i n t i f f s h a l l m a i n t a i n the fences enclosing the area
hereinabove

described.

3.

In the event d e f e n d a n t

is assessed a tax increase as

a result of p l a i n t i f f ' s m a i n t a i n a n c e or
property described

in p a r a g r a ~ u

improvement of the

' abovf",, plaintiff

reimburse d e f e n d a n t the a m o u n t c; said increased
w i t h i n thirty
4.

assessment

(30) d a y s w r i t t e n notice of payment
D e f e n d a n t g r a n t s to platntifr

shal 1

thereof.

an easement

for

p l a i n t i f f ' s ditch p r e s e n t l y running from the town of C e n t r a l
the r e s e r v o i r w h e r e v e r said ditch runs across d e f e n d a n t ' s
and p l a i n t i f f

land,

further shall have right to improve said ditch
- 2 -
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to

by

installation of a pipeline and have all necessary rights of
ingress and egress to maintain the same.
5.

In the event the reservoir and dike area described

in paragraph 1 above were to fall into non-use for a period of
ten (10) consecutive years, the easement granted in paragraph 2
above would expire with thirty (30) days written notice.
6.

In the event the ditch described in paragraph 4

above were to fall into non-use for a period of twenty (20)
consecutive years, the easement granted herein would expire with
thirty (30) days written notice.
7.

The public, including plaintiff, shall have a

perpetual and continuous easement for use of the present roadway
across SE1/4 NW1/4 Sec. 28, T39S, R16W, which consists of the
present access roads to the Brookside Estates Subdivision and
Brookside Summer Homes.
8.

An easement serving as the access road to the Lucky

Seven Ranch would continue to exist along the lines of the
present road from highway U-18 to the Lucky Seven Ranch, said
road being located in NW1/4 NW1/4 Sec. 28 T39S, R16W.
9.

Plaintiff shall immediately transfer to defendant

underground water rights in an amount sufficient to serve
culinary water to three (3) homes, with the exact amount to be
determined according to State Division of Water Resources
published standards.

Defendant shall make use of said water by
- 3 -
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drilling his o w n well or create his o w n point of diversion and
shall not be entitled to use of the wel 1 on plaintiff f s property
o! wi th 11: 1 th< s easeiiiei: it: , ai: "ea desc i: i bed in par ag r aph 1 above . If
Defendant fai Is to pi it the water rights transfered hereunder to
beneficial use within a period of five (5) years from the d a t h e i: e o f , s a i d i: I g h t s s h a 1 I a u f • i •> m a 11 c a ] ] y without notice, levert to
plaintiff.
10.

Parties hereby dismiss any and all claims arising

b y v i i: t ii e o f t h i s a c t ion o n e a g a i n s t t h e o t h e • i:,
DATED this

6(9

day of January, 1984
Plaintiff:
LUCKY 7 RODEO CORPORATION, I N C .

S/U4^<

„

/Z^—-

Tjrfnothy
B^Xi
Tjrfhothy B.
.Andersorf,
. / Attorney
t t o r n e y for
f o r Plaintiff
De^e«tJarrts2

^t^S^^
Pat

(Ch'as.) R. C l a r

•T/Phillip^Iiang
Attocriey f o r

Foremaster
Defendant

TBA821
-

4

-
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Timothy B. Anderson of
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK SMcDONOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
One South Main, Suite 300
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (801) 628-1627
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
LUCKY SEVEN RODEO CORPORATION
a Utah corporation,
ORDER 0-*Jf

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 7917

vs.
PAT CLARK, an individual/
Defendant,
oooOooo

The Court having reviewed the Stipulation and Settlement
Agreement of the parties above named/ and good cause therefore
showing IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

The claims of the respective parties heretof one

against the other are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
2.

Title to the reservoir and dyke area shall remain in

the name of Pat (Chas.) R. Clark and Tex Gates.

Said parcel

comprises that area used by Plaintiff Lucky Seven Ranch within
the fence lines and within the NWl/4 NWl/4 Sec. 28, T39S, R16W
and more specifically described as follows:
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of the Northwest
1/4 of the Northwest 1/4 of Section 28, Township 39
^
«*>
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oepurY

South, Range 16 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
said point being S 0° 36f W 1299.425 feet along the
Section line from the Northwest Corner of said
Section 28 and running thence N 0° 36f E 339.00
feet to a point on an old fence line; thence along
an old fence line as follows: N 79° 21' 30" E
543.00 feet; thence S 82° 30f E 30.01 feet; thence
S 18° 50' E 261.00 feet; thence S 7° 40' 30" E
200.00 feet to a point on the South line of the
Northwest 1/4 of said Section 28; thence leaving
said old fence line and running N 89° 09' 50" W
678.00 feet along the 1/16 line to the point of
beginning.
Containing 5.815 Acres.
3.

Plaintiff Lucky Seven Rodeo Corporation and its

successors and assigns (hereinafter "Plaintiff") shall have an
exclusive and perpetual easement to use, maintain and operate the
reservoir and dyke are which are described in paragraph 2 above
for irrigation, stock watering, corralling of animals and
agricultural purposes, together with the obligation that
plaintiff shall maintain the fences enclosing the area
hereinabove described.
4.

In the event defendant is assessed a tax increase as

a result of plaintiff's maintainance or improvement of the
property described in paragraph 2 above, plaintiff shall
reimburse defendant the amount of said increased assessment
within ten (10) days written notice of payment thereof.
5.

Plaintiff shall have an easement across defendants

land for its ditch presently running from the town of Central to
the reservoir described as existing within the property described
in paragraph 2 above, and plaintiff further shall have right to
- 2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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improve said ditch by installation of a pipeline and have all
necessary rights of ingress and egress to maintain the same.
6.

In the event the reservoir and dyke area described

in paragraph 2 above were to fall into non-use for a period of
ten (10) consecutive years, the easement granted in paragraph 3
above would expire automatically without notice.
7.

In the event the ditch described in paragraph 5

above were to fall into non-use for a period of twenty (20)
consecutive years, the easement granted herein would expire
automatically without notice.
8.

The public, including plaintiff, shall have a

perpetual and continuous easement for use of the present roadway
across SE1/4 NWl/4 Sec. 28, T39S, R16W, which consists of the
present paved access road to the Brookside Estates Subdivision.
9.

An easement serving as the access road to the Lucky

Seven Ranch would continue to exist along the lines of the
present road from highway U-18 to the Lucky Seven Ranch, said
road being located in NWl/4 NWl/4 Sec. 28 T39S, R16W.
10.

Plaintiff shall immediately transfer to defendant

underground water rights in an amount sufficient to serve three
(3) homes, with the exact amount to be determined according to
State Division of Water Resources published standards.

Defendant

shall make use of said water by drilling his own well or create
his own point of diversion and shall not be.entitled to use of
- 3 -•
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the well on plaintiff's property or within the easement area
described in paragraph 1 above.

If Defendant fails to put the

water rights transfered hereunder to beneficial use within a
period of five (5) years from the date hereof, said rights shall
automatically without notice, revert to plaintiff,
11.

Parties hereby dismiss any and all claims arising

by virtue of this action one agains
DATED this ~7

day of -fK^^mSej^ 198,3

BY THE COURT:

TBA821C
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JUDICIAL D£7 COURT
WWWJG7CN COUNTY

™"TS ,:;^..>-S3

t223B5-JSaK7>^

i i
a,13 jii
'J JAN 2 3 1986 |:
Philip L. Foremaster
Attorney at Law
165 North 100 East, Suite 1
P.O. Box 572
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (801)673-2209

j/jt^^ ^^rt^^.^y
_

_

CL£"K
DtPUTV

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH

LUCKY SEVEN RODEO
CORPORATION, a Utah
Corporation,
Plaintiff,

SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
ON
LEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS

SUPP-

-vsuivil No. 7917
rAT CLARK,
Defendant

This matter coming on for hearing before the Court sitting
without a jury on the 13th day of November, 1985 upon the Motion
tor Summary Judgment filed herein by Defendant based upon the
original Judgment filed herein and upon Defendant's supplemental
Motion for Interpretation of Judgment and for Order Terminating
Easement

and

the Plaintiff

being represented

by its attorney

Timothy B. Anderson and the Defendant, being present and being
represented by his attorney Phillip L. Foremaster and the Court
having on the 13th day of February, 1985 caused to be entered
herein its Order and Judgment wherein pursuant

to stipulation

of the parties and after having had trial of the issues between
the

parties

the issues

for

approximately

existing

between

two

days

them and

the

stated

parties
their

settled

settlement

in open
Court and thereupon having requested the Court to enter
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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its

order

prepared

pursuant

by counsel

to

said

stipulation,

for Plaintiff contained

which

order,

being

in part the follow-

ing statements:
i

i. The claims of the respective parties hereto, one
against the other are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
2.
Title to the reservoir and dyke area shall
remain in the name of Pat (Chas.) R. Clark
and Tex Gates. Said parcel comprises that area
used by Plaintiff Lucky Seven Ranch within the
tence lines and with the NW£ NW£ Sec. 28, T39S, R16W
and more specifically described as follows:
beg m n i n 8 at the Southwest Corner of the Northwest
t o f the Nort hwest i of Section 28, Township 39
Sou th, R ange 16 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
sai d poi nt be ing S 0°36'W 1299.425 feet along the
bee tion line from the Northwest Corner of said
f
Sec tion 28 an d running thence N 0°36 E 339.00 feet
to a poi nt on an old fence line; thence along
f
fT
E
an old f ence line as follows: N 79°21 30
f
^43 .00 f eet; thence S 82°30 E 30.01 feet; thence
5 1 8°50 T E 26 1.00 feet; thence S 7°40'30" E
200 .00 f eet t o a point on the South line of the
Nort hwest 1/4 of said Section 28; thence leaving
old f ence lin e and running N 89°09 f 50" W 678.00
tee t alo ng th e 1/16 line to the point of
beg innin
uo ntain ing 5.815 acres.

said

3. Plaintiff Lucky Seven Rodeo Corporation and its
successors
and
assigns
(hereinafter
"Plaintiff")
shall
have an exclusive and perpetual easement to use, maintain
and operate the reservoir and dyke area which are discribed
in paragraph 2 above for irrigation, stock watering,
corralling of animals and agricultural purposes, together
with
the obligation
that plaintiff
shall maintain
the
tences enclosing the area hereinabove described.
4.
In the event defendant is assessed a tax increase
as a result
of plaintiff's maintenance
or
improvement
of the property described in paragraph 2 above, plaintiff
shall reimburse defendant the amount of said increased
assessment within ten (10) days written notice of payment
thereof.
!D . Plaintiff shall have an easement across defendants
land for its ditch presently running from the town of
Central to the reservoir described as existing with the
property described
in paragraph 2 above, and
plaintiff
further shall have right to improve said ditch
by installation o a pipeline and have all necessary rights of
ingress
egress
to Library,
maintain
the
Digitized byand
the Howard
W. Hunter Law
J. Reuben Clark
Law same.
School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in paragraph 2 above were to fall into non-use for a period
of Ten (10) consecutive years, the easement granted in
paragraph 3 above would expire automatically without notice
And the Defendant having filed herein his Motion for Interpretation of Judgment and for Order Terminating Easement claim-ing as grounds for termination of said easement that the Plaintiff

had

property

voluntarily
said

stipulated

removed

reservoir

and

granted

from

the

above

and

dyke for which

as

aforesaid

described

said

thereby

real

easement

was

destroying

the

reason for the existance of said easement; and
That

Plaintiff

having

tation of Judgment and

answered

said

Motion

for Order Terminating

for

Interpre-

Easement

wherein

it admitted having voluntarily removed said reservoir and dyke
trom said real property and for which said easement was granted;
and
Plaintiff
a

portion

having

of

the

further

fencing

admitted

around

said

that
real

it

had

property

removed
that

it

had agred to maintain, in violation of the parties stipulation
and the order of the Court; and
The Court having been asked to interpret the said previous
Order
the

of

same

therefore

the

Court

based

having

been

to

construed

be

upon

the

prepared
in

by

parties'
counsel

favor

stipulation

for

Plaintiff

of Defendant

and

and
and

against

Plaintiff if any controversy as to its meaning exists; and
The Court having heard the testimony and evidence at trial
of

the

above

matter

of

the

parties

and

and
the

having
Court

heard

being

of

the

verbal

the

stipulation

opinion

that

the

reason the Plaintiff was granted such easement under the parties'

stipulation

upon

said

real

property

was
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to operate

and

tor

that

lation

purpose

only

and

the

reason

regarding

said

easement

was

for
to

the

parties*

provide

stipu-

said

use

and

said

easement

benefit to said abutting property; and
The

Court

hereby

finding

that

the

grant

of

was for the sole reason to enable Plaintiff to use and maintain
said reservoir and dyke; and
The

Court

hereby

finding

by clear

and

convincing

that at the time of the grant of said

easement

perty

dyke

there

said

time

said

real

existed

a

reservoir

the Plaintiff
property

and

has voluntarily

thereby

upon

said

thereon

removed

extinguishing

evidence

and

the

prosince

same

the' reason

from

for

the

grant of said easement in the first place; and
The

Plaintiff

reservoir

and

having

dyke

from

in

fact

destroyed

said

real

property

and
and

removed
further

removed part of the fence thereon thereby voluntarily
and

reason

for

said

easement

to

exist

and

and removal of the same having manifested

by

said
having

destroying

the

distruction

its intent to abandon

the same; and
The
of

the

Plaintiff
parties

having

and

Order

further
of

violated

the Court

by

the

failing

stipulation
to

maintain

the fences as provided therein;
NOW
cribed

THEREFORE,
easement

to Plaintiff
thereon

and

terminated
effect

and

it

on

the

right
for

and
it

hereby

above

other

hereby

maintain

purpose

declared

hereby

ORDERED

described

to use and

any

is

is

to

declared

that

real

the

above

property

granting

the reservoir

expressed
have

no

that

the

and

therein

is

further

force
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des-

Plaintiff

dyke

hereby

has

and
no

turther right, title and interest in the above described real

si
property.
uated this / ^ " d a x

f

/
of December, r985.

L

•Mhim
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I do hereby certify that on this

y^^-

day of

November, 1986, I served four copies of the Appellant's Brief in
Case No. 860067, Utah Supreme Court, on Phillip L. Foremaster,
Counsel for Pat Clark.

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH

s^2sz^
DALE R. CHAMBERLAIN

C4-1
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